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Is the business cycle dead? Or should the question be, “Was the
business cycle ever alive?” After most periods of extended expansion,
particularly if they also happen to be eras of bubbly capital gains, talk
about a “New Era” geysers up and, what is more important, such talk is
received with increasing credulity.
In my lifetime I have seen the soda fountain come into, and go out of,
the American drug store. So too with the university course in business
cycles. At the beginning of my teaching career, we had no courses in
macroeconomics as such, but we always did have a basic course in Money
and Banking. And to supplement that there was sure to be a course called
Business Cycles. I used as textbook for that course Wesley Mitchell’s 1927
survey of business cycles a ` la National Bureau of Economic Research, also
Alvin Hansen’s Business-Cycle Theory of the same year. But superseding
them came Gottfried Haberler’s 1937 Prosperity and Depression, whose
pages presented the embalmed bones of pre-General Theory orthodoxy:
monetary theories of the cycle; overinvestment theories; underconsump-
tion theories; exogenous theories such as sunspots, as well as endogenous
theories like those that combined the acceleration principle and the
multiplier.
My Harvard teacher Joseph Schumpeter’s 1939 two-volume treatise
is almost a parody of eclecticism: It described short cycles under the
Kitchin-Crum terminology; then the good old business cycle of allegedly
eight to ten years’ periodicity was labeled Juglar cycles; and of course
there were also the long waves of Kondratieff and the Sunday newspaper
supplements. But that was not the whole of it. In between Juglars and
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immigration, with an alleged approximate periodicity of 18 to 20 years.
The tortured epicycles of pre-Copernicus Ptolemaic astronomy had
nothing on Schumpeter.
I can sum up by stating that, if you mean by a business cycle a
periodic oscillation like the swing of a pendulum or the orbit of a planet,
then in economics no business cycle ever did exist. But a common pulse
in various time series, within time and also cross-sectionally, was just
perceptible in the data. Procrustes stretched his short victims to ﬁt an
inﬂexible bed and also compressed his tall ones to force a ﬁt. Similarly,
Mitchell at his wits’ end and with the help of Arthur Burns deﬁned
reference cycles, which had average characteristics in their beginning,
middle, and end, and much ingenuity was spent in relating speciﬁc cycles
to them.
All these post-1800 cycles were what we would call Main Street ups
and downs in production, price levels, and unemployment. Before
1800—and persisting ever since—economic science and mythology al-
ready knew ﬁnancial crises—manias, bubbles, and crashes cum bank
failures: Seventeenth century Dutch tulips and eighteenth century South
Sea Bubbles or John Law experiments provide examples. Gold discover-
ies and wartime inﬂations cannot legitimately be ruled off limits for
economists’ analysis. I descend to such a banality only to remind
New-Classical Rational-Expectationists how implausible is any assertion
about the impotence of policy actions to affect real variables rather than
aggregate price levels. I will return to this oldest economic mechanism of
bubbles and crashes.
ARE THINGS DIFFERENT IN “THE AGE AFTER KEYNES”?
It is a scientiﬁc sin not to notice likenesses that are there in the
empirical data. An equal sin is not to notice differences and changes.I nt h e
two-thirds of a century since 1933, the business cycle “ain’t been what it
used to be.” Let me quote from Victor Zarnowitz’s well-titled NBER
Working Paper 6367 of 1998, “Has the Business Cycle Been Abolished?”
(my italics):
[In the seven decades after 1870] six major depressions occurred in the United
States....N odeclines of comparable severity have been observed in the last
half-century following the depressed 1930’s and World War II.
Even when we take into account Christina Romer’s revisionist
upward adjustments to old-time recessions, I believe this Zarnowitz
generalization testiﬁes to an important truth: longer postwar expansions
and shorter recessions. Eschewing the naive attribution of this change
solely to Keynes’s General Theory, I agree with the innuendo that changed
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policy, helps explain the better macro performance of real GDPs in the
ﬁnal half of the twentieth century.
But I discern neither in the historical data, nor in the cogent advances
in economists’ models, any convergence toward the disappearance of
non-Pareto-optimal ﬂuctuations. Indeed, our success has risen just so far,
and probably the mixed-market economies of North America and Europe
are essentially marking time as far as further trend rates of “ﬁne and gross
tuning” are concerned. That is a personal judgment or guess.
Therapeutic successes have not come without costs. The age of
subdued booms and busts—before America’s labor force surprised us
with a new ﬂexibility and a new tolerance for accepting mediocre jobs—all
this had happened, until the last 15 years at least, in an age of somewhat
rising price levels. And in many a newspaper column I have had to write
sentences such as the following:
When the next recession arrives you will ﬁnd written on its bottom “Made in
Washington,” just as was the case with the last one. This is not because the Fed
is a sadist or an ignoramus; nor it is because the bedrooms in the White House
are occupied by politicians eager to lose elections. Rather it is like the fact that
hospitals are where most people die: If the central bank and ﬁscal authorities
did not step on the brakes of an overexuberant economy now, they might well
have to overdo that later. There is never a guarantee that intelligent and
feasible policies can be discovered which will lead to perpetual soft landings
at high employment and a steady price level.
The phoenix of real business cycles has been whistled up anew. But
it has not come from the ashes of a wrongly discarded real business cycle
methodology. That, like herpes, has always been with us.
What is new, and a little foolish, is the concept of a Pareto-optimal
real business cycle, like the one not in the history books, where at one time
in 1929 folks everywhere developed a desire to substitute intertemporally
leisure off the job for good paychecks.
I have published a number of papers on real business cycles. Many
of them can well take place at an unchanged price level, even though they
all concomitantly involve ﬂuctuations in outputs that ex ante and ex post
the citizenry ﬁnd regretful.
I am not here to preach a sermon. But wild horses cannot keep me
from saying this:
Implied in the previous paragraph is a critique of the notion that a good
independent central bank can optimally concern itself only with inﬂation.
You should not believe that the know-all and end-all ethically is concern
only for the price level, or that pragmatically that is a correct procedure
to follow. Right now, when the honeymoon U.S. economy may be
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tightening interest rates a bit in order to prolong the average level of U.S.
prosperity. Waiting until you see the whites of the eyes of wage- and
commodity-price inﬂation could be, from the standpoint of optimal
stochastic control activity, a wait too long.
Of course, one will qualify any such advice to take into account what
a Fed rise in the short-term interest rate might do to Asian slumps and to
Wall Street quasi-bubbles. This brings me to my closing irony.
The pre-1800 pattern of commercial panics had to be a case of NON
MACRO-EFFICIENCY of markets. We’ve come a long way, baby, in two
hundred years toward micro efﬁciency of markets: Black-Scholes option
pricing, indexing of portfolio diversiﬁcation, and so forth. But there is no
persuasive evidence, either from economic history or avant garde theo-
rizing, that MACRO MARKET INEFFICIENCY is trending toward ex-
tinction: The future can well witness the oldest business cycle mechanism,
the South Sea Bubble, and that kind of thing. We have no theory of the
putative duration of a bubble. It can always go as long again as it has
already gone. You cannot make money on correcting macro inefﬁciencies
in the price level of the stock market.
The International Monetary Fund and its critics, and the statesmen of
Asia, ﬁnd precious few answers in the Mitchell and Hansen and Haberler
taxonomies of Main Street business cycles—or for that matter few
answers in the post-General Theory literature—to those current dilemmas
and spectres that now haunt all the economies of the globe.
After I delivered this lecture, a high Federal Reserve ofﬁcial asked for
clariﬁcation as to whether the business cycle is after all still alive. So let
me make clear that, like the below-median poor, economic instability we
have always with us.
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